RESEARCH SYMPOSIUM: BEYOND THE SCHISM: POLITICAL SCIENCE RESEARCH AND THE MENA REGION SCHOLARLY IDENTITIES AND THE MAKING OF MIDDLE EAST IR: INSIGHTS FROM THE GLOBAL/POST-WESTERN IR DEBATE
By Morten Valbjørn (Aarhus University) and Waleed Hazbun (American University of Beirut ) As part of their ongoing explorations into the d evelopment of IR scholarship about the M idd le East, on November 3, 2017 Morten Valbjørn (Aarhus University) and Waleed Hazbun (American University of Beirut) organized a workshop at Aarhus University in Denmark entitled "Do scholarly id entities 'in here' shape how we und erstand the role of id entity politics in Midd le East international relat ions 'out there'?" This workshop brought together nine scholars based at European, American and M iddle Eastern universities to explore, in part, how the M idd le East might be better incorporated into ongoing d ebates about what have been termed "Global IR" and the "post-Western" IR. The starting point for this project builds from Cox's (1986) observation that IR "theory is always for someone and for some purpose. There is…no such thing as theory in itself d ivorced from a stand point in time and space" . Valbjørn and Hazbun were curious to ask how id entity politics "in here" , that is id entities within and between communities of scholars, have shaped the d evelopment of IR scholarship about the Mid dle East as well as IR scholarship prod uced by scholars based in the region.
During the past two d ecad es, there has been a growing d ebate within the broad er field of IR Theory concerning the d evelopment of IR scholarship beyond North America and Europe (Tickner 2003 , M andaville 2003 , Acharaya and Buzan 2007 , Tickner & Waever 2009 , Acharya 2014 . Such projects seeking to d evelop a "Global IR" or foster non/post -Western approaches to IR tak e as a point of d eparture Stanley Hoffmann's (1977) observation forty years ago about how IR appears to be an "American Social Science" and Ole Waever's (1998) suggestion that the "IR might be quite different in d ifferent places" . In particular, since the t urn of the new millennium these observations have given rise to a multi -dimensional d ebate in IR about 1) whether IR has been mad e "by and for the West" (Barkawi and Laffey 2006) and what this means for our way of studying and und erstanding international r elations; i.e. how have some issues/forms of knowled ge been consid ered more important/legitimate than others; 2) whether and how it is possible to id entify substantially different ways of studying international relations elsewhere; i.e. is the "internation al" imagined in id entical ways everywhere and is "security" perceived d ifferently in d ifferent places?; and 3) which kind of strategies are more likely to make International Relations Theory genuinely international, not only regarding what is studied but also when it comes to how and by whom; i.e., how can the "non-West" to a larger extent become a "prod ucer of knowled ge" rather than being only an "object of knowled ge" and how can insights from d ifferent places be connected in a genuinely international d ebate? (Tickner 2003 , Hellmann & Valbjørn 2017 .
At first sight, consid ering the global prominence of Said's (1978) critique about the "Western" prod uction of knowled ge about the "East" , one might expect the study of M iddle East international relations to be one of the field s where concerns about id entity politics within comm unity of knowled ge prod uction ("in here") would have received consid erable attention. This is, however, far from the case. While the Middle East accord ing to the TRIP survey on theory and practice of International Relations around the world may figure as one of the most studied region s "beyond the West", and M idd le East specialists d uring the years have prod uced a rich and increasingly sophisticated literature on id entities "out there", Middle East IR have only to a limited extent reflected on whether and how political, cultural, and professional id entities might shape the scholarshi p and influence how id entities "out there" are approached, theorized d iscussed and evaluated . To the extent that scholarly id entities "in here" have been d ebated among M iddle East scholars, it has mainly been related to the (in reality very US -centric) Area Studies Controversy between generalists and regional specialists on how to study "regions" (e.g. Tessler et al. 1999; Valbjørn 2004 , Teti 2007 . However, the role of "geo-cultural epistemologies" (Tickner & Waever 2009) and "the culturalinstitutional context" (Jørgensen & Knudsen 2006) have only received very limited attention. As a reflection of this, questions about how M iddle East international relations has been stud ied within the region itself or whether for instance American and European M idd le East scholars differ in how they approach the region have only rarely been adressed (among the exceptions, see Ko rany 1986 , Abu Jaber 1991 , Dessouki & Korany 1991 , Korany, 1999 Bilgin 2004 , 2012 , Korany and Makd isi, 2009 Yassine-Hamd am & Pearson 2014, Hasan and M omani, 2012; M ansour 2017; see also Hazbun, 2013 , Valbjørn 2017 . The Middle East has in a s imilar way been almost absent in the broad er post -Western IR d ebates, which instead have been occupied by d iscussions concerning Chinese, Indian, European and L atin American IR.
Against this background, the aim of the workshop was to remedy this gap through an exploration of " the role of scholarly id entities in the study of id entity politics in M iddl e East international relations" . This exploration was not only intend ed to provid e answers to questions about whether, how, and why scholarly id entities "in here" -in terms of our geographical, d isciplinary and cultural -institutional context and background -matters in how scholars approach, theorize, d iscuss and evaluate M iddle East international relations in general and regional id entity politics more specifically. It, furthermore, sought to promote a greater awareness of whether and how these possible d ifferences can enrich our und erstanding of (Midd le East) international relations "out there" and the workings of IR and M iddle East stud ies "in here" . The first part of the workshop sought to cultivate insights for the project from scholars with experience working outsid e the Midd le East. Drawing on his experience exploring the work of IR scholars in Latin America, India, and China , Peter M arcus Kristensen (Copenhagen University) warned that many existing projects of Global IR were viewed by scholars of those regions as efforts to id entify difference that did not resonate with the views of local scholars and failed to embrace their " creative agency" . M eanwhile, Knud Erik Jørgensen (Aarhus University) argued that "the post-Western d iscussion does not point in any d istinct or specific direction, except that there might be no direction home" . He suggested that instead of "continuing in t he orthod ox track of critique of orientalism" a stronger engagement between Middle East scholars and the post -Western IR d ebate could "globalize awareness of representations, not only in the West but globally", lead to "a critical reconstruction of IR trad itions in the Middle East" and "encourage theorizing among IR scholars in the M iddle East" and help "crystallizing knowled ge in theoretical form about the M iddle East. " Having worked on the question of African IR while based at University of Cape Town, Kar en Smith (L eid en University) also warned about the limits of being confined to one area stud ies focus but highlighted the great potential of systemic theorizing in IR by d rawing on regions outsid e Europe and North America. Citing the Jean & John Comaroff's (2011) Theory from the Sou th , Smith suggested the Global North was becoming progressively more like the Global South. "M ost of the world ", she noted "has a much closer resemblance to the multi -actor, variable power context of places like the Midd le East o r Africa, where it is not always clear who holds the monopoly over the legitimate use of violence, where bord ers are constructed and often meaningless, where sovereignty is challenged , where interests overlap and intersect, where id entit ies are messy and e verchanging".
The second part of the workshop drew on scholars who have worked on and /or in the Middle East and includ ed two papers that generated method ological insights followed by two that offer programmatic suggestions for the future d evelop ment of M iddle East IR. Pinar Bilgin's (Bilkent University) discussion of Said's (1993) notion of "contrapuntal read ing" helped the workshop formulate its own approach by suggesting it simultaneously address the limits of both IR and Middle East studies , which it can view through a lens of double exile. M ay Darwich's (University of Durham) narrated her own journey from Cairo University, to SciencesPo Bord eaux, to Edinburgh University, to the German Institute for Global and Area Stud ies (GIGA) to Durham University and her parallel evolution from a stud ent of realism to a scholar working within sociological and id eational approaches . Her account inspired the workshop to see the broad er value of such selfreflexive accounts in its effort to map the influence of institutional factors and how scholars choose to engage with them shape patterns of knowled ge prod uction in the field . Imad Mansour (Qatar University) offered a powerful critique of ontological categories and the forms of knowled ge found in most of the existing IR scholarship about the Middle East. As an alternative, M ansour suggests we ask, "what are the dialogues that people (scholars and non -scholars) are engaged in within the region?" He then outlined some of the main themes that such an approach would likely d evelop, spanning from how "the international" is und erstood to the construction of states and norms. Finally, Hazbun offered a mapping of the geopolitics of knowledge prod uction in (Global) IR from the point of view of the M iddle East that addressed its p ast evolution and possible futures. Taking some inspiration from what Robert Vitalis (2015) termed the "Howard School of International Relations" , that represented the most important center of opposition to the project of "white" American IR as they highlighted the role of racism in sustaining imperialism, Hazbun noted his ongoing work as part of a transnational collective of IR and critical security studies scholars supported by the Beirut -based Arab Council for the Social Sciences (ACSS). Their goal is to foster critical approaches to the stud y of security and insecurity by scholars from and based in the Arab world. In an approach that workshop attend ee Steve Niva (The Evergreen State College/Roskild e University) characterized as mod eled like an insurgency , Hazbun suggested that IR in the Middle East should be d eveloped along the lines of a constellation of d iverse nod es of IR knowled ge prod uction across the Global South that "are autonomous, yet connected to other nod es of global IR organized along more horizontal, d emocratic networks" .
One of the achievements of the workshop, at least in the view of its co-organizers, was that it highlighted how self-reflective observations by the workshop participants about the role of scholarly id entities, geo-cultural location, and institutional context shaping their own recent and ongoing d evelopment could assist in offering a limited, preliminary mapping of how such forces have been shaping the d evelopment of the Middle East IR. Clearly, no one believes that these factors d etermine the path and limitations of scholarship, but they often exert influence in subtle, unselfconscious, and highly contingent ways. In drawing together workshop contributions for publication and in their future efforts, Valbjørn and Hazbun hop e to connect the region to d ebates about post -Western IR and Global IR and assist in the d evelopment of pathways for the future d evelopment of IR scholarship by and for IR scholars from and based in the region. Ac h ar ya , Amit a v (2 0 14) . "G lob a l I nte r na ti o na l R e la ti o ns ( I R) a nd R e gi o na l Wor lds ". I n te r na ti o na l S t ud ie s Qu ar t er ly , vo l. 58 , no . 4 , p p. 6 47 -65 9.
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Y a s si ne -H a md am , Na h la & F rede ric S. Pe ar so n (ed s .) (20 14 The military's economic and political hegemony has a long history in the country's po st-colonial past. It began in the 1950s-60s und er Egypt's first military regime of Nasser. But the more recent history of this process goes back to M ubarak's neoliberal policies that he embraced after the Gulf War in 1991. When M ubarak transitioned into th e market economy, he allowed the officers to convert large segments of the gigantic d efense ind ustry to target the civilian consumer market and also create new business ventures. Neoliberal economic reforms entailed M ubarak cut public spending, including i n the military bud get. Arguably in ord er to "coup-proof" his regime, i.e., protect it from potential officer mutiny, M ubarak granted the military extensive business privileges that enabled it to create a business empire. For the same reason, M ubarak appoin ted an everincreasing number of retired generals in top government positions responsible for the liberalization of the economy.
On the one hand, I argue that a class of "neoliberal officers" was born in the Egyptian civilian market d uring the 1990s and expand ed vastly through the 2000s. Those officers d id not necessarily believe in the d ictates of the free market; in fact, they functioned against them and often d istorted this market through enjoying supra privileges above private and public enterprises. Military entrepreneurs enjoyed superior access to state land , had exceptional tax breaks, violated labor rights, and functioned above public accountability. They managed factories of cement, steel, Jeep cars, fertilizers, home appliances, processed food, e tc. They grabbed immense pieces of land to construct toll highways and cultivate vast commercial farms.
The existence of such a class of military entrepreneurs is not exceptional to Egypt. It is a global phenomenon born in many other countries transformi ng to the market after the end of the Cold War and the triumph of the U.S. economic mod el. According to Jörn Brömmelhörster and Wolf-Christian Paes, military business, or "Milbus" emerged when the IM F and the World Bank pushed governments transforming to neoliberalism to ad opt more conservative fiscal policies. Structural ad justment and reform measures required substantial cuts in public spending. M any of these regimes allowed their armies to create business enterprises that compensated for their bud getary losses, mostly in ord er to avoid potential military coups. In the Arab states in particular, Philippe DrozVincent explains that when armies in authoritarian regimes, such as Egypt, Syria, and Iraq, started to invest in the civilian sector, they maneuvered the market for their benefit and grew into "parasitic" and monopolistic tycoons.
On the other hand , I argue that officers enjoyed an invisible hegemonic status within M ubarak's bureaucratic apparatus. While M ubarak maintained a civilian face for the stat e in Cairo by forming cabinets of civilian technocrats, retired generals were the invisible d e facto rulers of the country and public administrators of its liberalized economy. They were the actual rulers of most of provincial Egypt through occupying seats of local governors, heads of towns, head s of neighborhood s, etc. They also managed every sea, river, and land port, and d ominated public transportation as a whole from buses and ferryboats to airlines. They took charge of government authorities that provid ed basic public services to the citizens, from water and sewerage and afford able housing to garbage collection and urban beautification. M ore important, ex-officers were hired head s of numerous government authorities responsible for the main economic reform schemes. They managed public authorities allocating state land to public projects or private business, along with the authorities of investment, import and export, tourism, and more.
When the 2011 U prisings broke out, the public attempt at d emilitariz ing the economy and the state bureaucracy quickly failed . While in power between February 2011 and June 2012, SCAF faced a sweeping wave of labor strikes and sit -ins targeting military business managers and public ad ministrators. SCAF oppressively contained the situation by d eploying the military police to d isperse sit -ins or crush protesters, and issued an anti -strike law that sent many protesting laborers and government employees to military trials and jail. In the following year, SCAF allied itself with the rising, wealthy Islamists, and collected more ad vantages in business and politics. The M uslim Brother's elected presid ent, M ohamed M orsy, to whom SCAF d elivered power in the summer of 2012, maintained the privileged status of the army in the bureaucracy, by hiring more ex -officers as ministers, governors, and as other top administrators. M oreover, the Brotherhood granted the military a semi -autonomous status in the constitution that they issued in December 2012. This constitution kept the military bud ge t -even pertaining to revenue from civilian businessesabove state oversight and public scrutiny.
Needless to say, since a new military presid ent, Abd el Fattah al -Sisi, was elected in 2014, the size of military business has tremend ously expand ed and t he number of ex-generals appointed in top bureaucratic positions has proliferated . This is taking place within a d omestic context of fund amental market reforms required by the conditions of a large IM F loan of $12 billion.
Before and after the 2011 Uprisings , scholars across various d isciplines investigated the subject of military business and political control. When M ubarak partially liberalized the economy in the 1980s, political scientist Robert Springborg scrutinized how the charismatic minister of d efense then, Abd el -Halim Abu Ghazala, ventured into civilian business while enjoying exceptional political authority. Abu Ghazala's army then enjoyed access to U.S. arms and attempted to foster ties with American business. In the 1990s, sociologist M ona Ab aza investigated the rise of the army's shopping malls in newly constructed bourgeois suburbs in Cairo. They were American-style malls built on land that the military appropriated d uring the wars with Israel and used for projects targeting a sweeping consumer culture. After SCAF took over power, Shana Marshall used her comparative politics perspective to reveal the Egyptian army's ties with regional and international capital, and its business enterprises in areas such as petrochemicals and maritime sectors. From a unique comparative literature approach, Dalia Said M ustafa shed light on how the officers' economic outreach and corruption eclipsed their public image as former war heroes in Egyptian cinema. M y work has benefited from all these diverse approaches in looking at the history and recent realities of the Egyptian military.
M ore research across d isciplines is still need ed in ord er to investigate other pressing issues about the currently ruling officers. For instance, research on labor rights within mi litary enterprises; compulsory conscripted sold iers fighting the current war on Jihad ists; military control over the city and urban life; art and military public propagand a; and more is necessary and with diverse approaches in ord er to build a comprehensiv e und erstand ing of the Egyptian military institution. 
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S p rin gb o rg, R ob e rt ( 2018) . Eg ypt. C amb rid ge: P ol it y P re ss . This disappointing performance has initially been attributed to a "resource curse" , which refers to the parad ox that countries with natural resource wealth tend to grow less rapidly than those without such resources. Economic symptoms of the curse includ ed Dutch disease, macroeconomic volatility and d ebt overhang, among other ills (Sachs and Warner, 1994 ). Yet, this article argues that the Arab world is cursed by weak political institutions rather than by oil, or alternatively that the curse is real but conditional upon the presence of bad political governance (Elbad awi and Soto, 2016) .
DISPELLING THE OIL CURSE MYTH
Weak political institutions have pred ated resource d iscoveries and over time have shaped economic incentives that affect how oil rents are collected , allocated and used , and , therefore , influenced economic outcomes (Galal and Selim, 2013) . Over time, the interaction between oil and politics became intertwined, preventing Arab countries from embarking on a sustainable d evelopment path. M oreover, empirical evid ence shows that the oil curse d oes exist but is cond itional upon bad political governance. Yet, a striking policy message from Elbadawi and Soto (2016) is that d emocracy is a necessary but insufficient condition to escape the curse: only resource-rich countries with both a high d egree of d emocracy and political check s and balances are likely to escape it (table 1). Figure 1 shows that oil-rich Arab countries lag behind in measures of political openness. In 2014, out of the 205 countries covered by Freedom House, no Arab oilrich economy was consid ered to be "free". Only one country is consid ered to be partly free, that is Kuwait. M oreover, most countries, especially in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), have not und ertaken any meaningful political reforms since the 1970s.
With weak institutions, oil wealth (accounting for at least two-thirds of fiscal revenues) turned Arab governments into rentier states and provid ed them with the means to buy off political consent with economic privileges. M ost GCC governments a re not only able to apply low tax rates but also to efficiently redistribute oil revenues through labor markets to national citizens in the form of well -remunerated public-sector jobs and other generous social welfare schemes with the aim of fostering auth oritarian rule. M ore concretely, when regional political unrest mounted in 2011, oil revenues allowed GCC governments to generously appease citizens. Kuwait and Bahrain respond ed by giving out cash, Bahrain and Oman provid ed public sector jobs, and Saud i Arabia and Oman raised workers' wages and benefits. Accord ing to Hertog (2012), Saud i Arabia approved an increase in expend iture by US$130 billion to finance the creation of 120,000 new public -sector jobs, build ing 500,000 houses, setting a minimum wage of US$800 in the public sector, provid ing a onetime bonus to incumbent civil servants, and creating an unemployment assistance scheme.
ESCAPING THE CURSE
L arge oil resources, like those present in the Arab world, are a blessing. They have contributed to better stand ards of living and have most certainly wid ened states' set of policy choices. Notwithstand ing this improvement, the economic performance of Arab oilrich countries has been disappointing. This article suggests that escaping the curse requires that Arab countries ad opt measures to improve political inclusiveness and political checks and balances. As a second best, ad hering to the Extractive Ind ustr ies Transparency Initiative (EITI) -which provid es a global standard for transparency in the oil ind ustryand the National Resource Charter (NRC) -which offers more comprehensive principles for governments and societies on how to best harness the opportunities for d evelopment generated by extractive commod ity wind falls -can serve as anchors for enhancing transparency and accountability.
Second , the reform of fiscal institutions would improve resource management, increase savings and release resources for diversification. According to Collier (2016) , the GCC needs to start saving 30 percent of their hyd rocarbons revenues in 2013 and increase this ratio to 100 percent by 2083. Sovereign wealth funds (SWF) would be a useful vehicle to save these revenues in financial assets abroad a nd rid e out revenue volatility.² Other Arab countries with less wealth and shorter resource horizons wealth (like Algeria, Sud an and Yemen) need to save 50 percent of their hydrocarbons revenues and raise this ratio to 100% by 2043. In add ition to a SWF, these countries also need a Sovereign Development fund (SDF) to invest their wealth in d omestic infrastructure, a process called "investing in investing" (Collier, 2016) . These countries would also greatly benefit from improving the efficiency of public investment projects to avoid "white elephant" unnecessary and wasteful projects.
M oreover, the ad option of a fiscal rule, through setting numerical limits on bud getary aggregates, would allow governments to d etermine the shares of oil revenues to be spent through the bud get versus those that are saved for future generations. The experience of Chile in this regard can inspire Arab oil exporters as fiscal rules have helped smooth revenue volatility while mitigating discretionary spen ding (Schmidt-Hebbel, 2016).
To conclud e, the best way to turn the curse into a blessing in the Arab World is to improve the prevailing political institutions, which form the d eep roots of the curse and have contributed to poor economic outcomes. Current low oil prices present a wind ow of opportunity for policymakers to und ertake many reforms that would embark their economies on a sustainable d evelopment. 
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BRICS RISING POWERS AND THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT
By Guy Burton
What is the role of rising powers and the By surveying the powers' approach to the conflict over d ecad es, I sought to provid e historical co ntext to the present, when the BRICS were initially id entified as a group of key emerging markets to watch and their subsequent self-organization. Stretching the narrative enabled comparison of these powers to earlier period s, especially the emergence of challenges towards the hegemonic powers associated with the Third World , non-alignment and global South d uring the 1960s and 1970s.
However, d espite a more multipolar environment after 2000, I observed more diversity in rising power behavior and management towards the conflict d uring the 1960s and 1970s. Brazil and Ind ia were active participants in peacekeeping between Israel and the Arab states before 1967 while the Soviets and China were both active in provid ing financial and military assistance to Israel's Arab and Palestinian rivals respectively. As South Africa's apartheid regime became a global pariah, it mad e common cause with Israel, through large arms purchases and d evelopment in nuclear technology.
By contrast, following the establishment of the O slo process, the BRICS countries took a step back from d irect engagement with the conflict. In its place , they focused more on the d evelopment of diplomatic and economic relations with both conflict parties; a process which has been labelled "normalization ". This was especially pronounced in relation to Israel, which shifted from relative international isolation d uring the 1970s to formalized and d eepening ties with these powers. This separation between the conflict and "normal" d iplomacy continued even aft er Oslo failed , with a collapse into the violence of the Second Intifad a and Israel's continuing occupation of the West Bank (and siege after 2005 of Gaza).
The Oslo process has retained legitimacy and support from the international community, including t he BRICS, although it has only resulted in period ic negotiations and without an indication of a final resolution of the conflict. In add ition, the process has d one little to challenge the asymmetrical power exercised by Israel against the Palestinians. The continuing focus on Oslo has meant that state actors have been less attentive to other, alternative efforts to tackle the conflict. Arguably the most significant in the post-2000 period is the transnational Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement (Falk 2013) . To d ate much of its efforts have been targeted in North America and Europe, which have provid ed most political and financial assistant for Oslo. L ooking further afield , at the rising powers, the BDS has yet to make inroads into civil societies in authoritarian China and Russia, but has had more success in d emocracies like Brazil, Ind ia and South Africa -albeit on the margins of the political system, including leftist parties in Brazil and India and the activist wing of the ANC party in South Africa (Barghouti 2015).
The reasons for BRICS persistence with Oslo and reticence to acknowled ge and pursue alternatives like the BDS may be attributed to a pragmatic and selective approach to international affairs and conflict management. Despite critic izing the failure of US mediation, they d emonstrate no appetite to d isplace the more prominent US and European presence in the Oslo process. At the same time, they are aware of their shrunken influence in relation to the conflict, their involvement being l imited to mod est contributions to humanitarian or d evelopment assistance.
The broad er implications of my survey challenge the assumption that rising powers will pursue more ind epend ent forms of action as the global system opens up. As the case of the Arab-Israeli conflict suggests, rising power behavior may be more conservative and less reformist. This therefore places the work at the more critical and emerging end of the literature spectrum relating to rising powers in international relations generally, a nd specifically in the case of the BRICS (see Bond and García 2015 , Paul, L arson and Wohlforth 2014 , Paul 2016 . Of course, this observation is the result of one particular and long running case of international conflict and far from the home regions assoc iated with the five states concerned . Therefore, more case studies of conflicts and other rising powers are need ed to further test the find ings and extend the analysis. APSA -MENA Fellowship in 2013 and was a Research Fellow at Birzeit University, Palestine between 2010 and 2012 
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DEMOCRATIZATION FROM A CROSS-REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE: HOW CAN GAME THEORETIC MODELS OF LATIN AMERICAN TRANSITIONS INFORM THE ARAB REGION?
By Shim aa Hat ab
The Arab Uprisings of 2010-2011 generated a great hope that a "fourth wave of d emocratization" has finally hit the shore of the Arab region. Within a few short years, however, these prospects gave way to brutal wars in Syria and Yemen, state failure in L ibya, return of old -regime figures in Tunisia, and a new authoritarian crackd own in Egypt. The installation of the military regimes was a prod uct of a "trichotomous" game between the military establishment, right-wingers and business sectors, and left ist forces. The "strategic equilibrium" between the three players entailed a political impasse that benefited the military junta to gain grip on power. The assumptions of the "impossible game" of d emocratic equilibrium in L atin America through the 1960s an d 1970s centered on:
1. The labor -based parties were the largest organized forces and they would not rule d emocratically. The M arxist -left was ambivalent about d emocratic practices and caused polarization in L atin American society.
2. No large right-wing opposition would be strong enough to win in elections unless there were some restrictions on the left.
3. The right wing and business groups accepted the military as the umpire of the electoral game (when threatened it would intervene to terminate the round of electoral game and maintain stability) Donnell (1973: 180) summarized the Argentine stalemate between 1955-66 saying:
Once one round of the game has been played and knowled ge of rules is perfect, it is evid ent that it is a futile game which no one can win. Consequently, a rational player becomes "non-allegiant" (he rejects the game, or at least has no interest in its continuation) and "irresponsible" (since everyone will lose eventually, whatever short -term gains are possible should be pursued ). Not only is the game futile, but its dynamic has increased polarization. With no players to seek its continuatio n, it can easily be terminated .
I draw parallels between the position of the rival actors in Latin America d uring the 1960s and the role of Islamists and secular opposition groups in the M iddle East since 2011. Both regions faced serious contention over the political inclusion of id eologically-polarizing forces -the Marxist L eft in L atin America and Islamists in the M iddle East -that are staunchly opposed by other actors and d istrusted for their ambivalence toward d emocratic norms. And both have inherited authoritarian parties and coercive institutions that were certain to remain principal players following any regime transition, compelling uncerta in processes of political learning and institutional "repurposing".
How can d emocracy be introd uced in political contexts wherein a plethora of actors are willing to resort to force to crush their rivals and ad vance their own agend a? Efforts to answer th is question entailed a fundamental reflection on players' strategies, payoffs, and incentive structures. L atin America's experience provid es ample evid ence of d emocracy's capacity to transform political behavior. It shows how d emocratic institutions had be en a "congealed rational choice" to alter the strategic environment and the incentive system of conflict resolution between the key power competitors. The adherence of rival actors to d emocratic mod es of conflict resolution rested upon strategic calculations and a form of rulebound consent between winners and losers as follows:
-Electoral processes and representation of all major players in collective d ecision -making are ex ante uncertain.
-Actors who "lose" in any cycle of d emocratic contestation are allowed to compete over power in subsequent cycles, without the "winners" breaking the game to ensure their perpetuation in power.
-Both d emocratic victories and d efeats are provisional in nature, lending an "intertemporal character to political conflic ts" (Przeworski 1991) and offering a potential solution to political conflict in iterative electoral game cycles.
Political actors may thus be transformed over time as they ad just their organizational capacity, id eological orientation, and strategic behavior to a new incentive system that is shaped by contingent and institutionalized mod es of d emocratic contestation. Such mechanisms of change, however, are far from automatic or pre-d etermined . Democratic transitions d o get aborted , or reversed . The L atin American experience merely suggests that these challenges are not inherently insoluble. Certainly, they cannot be surmounted so long as pivotal players believe they are capable of vanquishing their opponents and imposing their preferred rules. Democratic institutions of conflict resolution emerge when power resources are sufficiently d ispersed so as to prevent any play er from unilaterally crushing its opponents. This may require either a "strategic equilibrium ", or a necessary political stalemate between contending forces.
In El Salvad or in the early 1990s, the state and militant groups were both well -armed and incapa ble of inflicting a d ecisive military d efeat on the other. ARENA (Nationalist Republican Alliance) -an 'authoritarian successor party' (L oxton 2016) found ed by a former head of military intelligencestarted negotiations with the FM LN (Farabund o M artí National L iberation Front) guerrilla movement to end the civil war that claimed 70,000 lives. A stalemate is less obvious where the state's security apparatuses have pred ominantly coercive power -i.e., much of the M ENA region tod ay. Needless to say, both the FML N and ARENA had suspected the d emocratic cred entials of the other when peace accords first incorporated the guerrilla movement into the d emocratic process in the early 1990s. In 2009, ARENA peacefully hand ed over power to the FML N after former M arxist rebel M auricio Funes of the FML N party won the elections, marking the first time in two d ecad es that a leftist presid ent has been voted into office. Thus, patterns of shared political learning, confid ence build ing, and d emocratic habituation can be achieved in the process of conflict management through institutionalized means.
In Argentina, the stalemate led to a long -term d ouble crisis, a crisis of legitimacy because of the d egree of exclusion and the crisis of efficacy because of the incapability of the military regime to sustain its support base. In 1983 the old fierce competitors changed their calculus and allied to form the multiparty opposition alliance, M ultipartid aria, and seized the initiative and imposed its improvised program on the retreating military incumbent elites.
The Chilean case d emonstrated , however, the capacity of societal actors to carve out autonomous spaces and mobilize their own power resources in ways that und ermine the ability of autocrats to govern effectively, and thus chang ing the political calculus and strategies for a wid e range of actors. The elite pacts that prod uce mechanisms of contingent consent as a "strategic equilibrium" in the d emocratization mod els are very unlikely to occur in the absence of such mobilization fr om below. The right-wing and left-wing parties helped reconstruct Chilean d emocracy in 1989-90 following 17 years of the Pinochet dictatorship and the extreme id eological polarization of Salvad or Allend e's d emocratic socialist experiment. The center -left coalition constructed between old rivals: the Socialists (who supported Allend e) and the Christian Democrats (who opposed Allend e's economic policies and applaud ed the military takeover).
As such, the Arab Uprisings may have fallen short of meeting its d em ocratic aspirations -but it surely pushed the authoritarian boundaries and took the region closer to the d emocratic frontier. The Troika promise of Ennahda and the two secular partnersthe Congrès pour le République (CPR) and Ettakatol -in Tunisia -between 2011 and 2013 -and the peaceful alternation of power away from the Islamistled ruling coalition in 2014 could serve as another beginning "nod e" of future "sequential games" in the region. 
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GATHERING DATA
Carrying out surveys in authoritarian contexts or in internal conflict areas can be difficult if not impossible not only because of the difficulty of obtaining permission from local authorities, but also because of the risks to field researchers. In Iraq, the AT survey was restricted to surveying governorate s away from the bord er with Syria because of the invasion by the so-called Islamic State taking place in 2014 at the time the survey was being carried out. In L ibya, the ongoing conflict disrupted data collection, which mad e it impossible for d ata collecto rs to hand in to the office 200 completed questionnaires. In Egypt, d ata collectors were at times prevented by police from going into certain areas. Similarly, ArabBarometer did not carry out surveys in Iraq or L ibya in 2016, Gallup World Poll (GWP) has on ly once carried out a survey in L ibya in 2012, and the AfroBarometer (AfB) has never cond ucted surveys here.
There are also issues of d ata quality. It is important that surveys be carried out comparably in each country, and that d ata collectors be traine d ad equately and supervised in the field . While d ata quality in surveys in d eveloping countries is generally fit for purpose (Inglehart and Welzel, 2010) it is important that quality assurance is rigorously carried out both in the field and once d ata colle ction is complete. Principal investigators are usually located at a distance and rely on local teams to carry out surveys and this can be problematic. In our case, we encountered problems that are common to other public opinion surveys carried out in the r egion, such as translating questionnaires into Arabic and ensuring that the survey managers in each country have a common und erstanding of how the survey ought to be cond ucted ( Response rates to surveys are generally hi gh in the region: in AT, these varied from j ust und er 90 per cent to 96 percent. There is, however, a problem of missing values, most frequently a result of respond ents answering with "d on't know" . The non-response rate varies by country and is higher on q uestions about political attitud es and preferences. High nonresponse rates may be d ue to poor interviewer training -in surveys data collectors are trained to encourage respond ents to select one of the options and instructed not to read out "d on't know" . Alternatively, they may be d ue to uncertaint y -some respond ents genuinely "d on't know" and it is possible that the proportion of these is lower where d ata collectors have been trained to encourage respond ents to give a positive answer. These variations across cases make the comparison between countries problematic. Cases with missing values are generally exclud ed from d ata analysis or these missing values are replaced by the sample mean. Statistical analysis beyond the reporting of frequencies requires thi s. The reporting of the proportion of the respond ents that hold a particular value can be misleading if the "d on'ts" are exclud ed.
In AT, for example, 93.1 percent of Egyptians agree that d emocracy is the best system of government d espite its faults, but this falls to 61.5 percent if d on't knows are includ ed . Furthermore, non-respond ents are unlikely to be normally distributed across the sample (Berinsky and Tucker. 2006) with findings potentially being misleading (Teti et al 2017) . Analysis of the cases with relatively high proportion of "d on't knows" in the AT d ata found that old er people -especially old er women -were d isproportionately represented meaning that their attitud es are likely to und errepresented in the write up of the find ings of the rese arch. Furthermore, where "d on't know" is the 'positive' answer of a noticeable number of respond ents, such important information is lost. In AT, the non -response rates were notably higher in Tunisia and especially Egypt, and more so on "political" questions.³ Both countries were going through turbulent political changes d uring the time of the survey, and it is conceivable that some In assembling a data set to investigate how values and attitud es changed before and after the Uprisings, we found large gaps in d ata availability (Table 1 ) , ⁴ which makes the stud y of change over time d ifficult. Not all the countries that we surveyed were includ ed in every pre-2011 survey wave. Numbers were red uced further after d ata had been cleaned with Percent Match, resulting in some countries' d ata sets being removed . In the wake of the Uprisings, all countries we surveyed were includ ed in the AB, but AfroB arometer only covers North Africa. M oreover, in World Values Survey and AB not all batteries of questions are asked in each wave, and even where the same topics are present, questions and their word ing often vary. While values may change relatively slowly, dramatic and sudd en change as happened in 2010 -11 may have a more marked impact. Cost and feasibility of d oing the survey in a country also affect inclusion in the sample. Cond ucting surveys requires substantial funding, which is increasingly d ifficult to obtain. Instead , researchers have used pooled data sets to look at change over time. Ind irect qu estions are those that, for example, ask respond ents if they think that various types of political systems are suitable for their country without mentioning regime types, ⁶ how important they think it is that shari'a is used as a guid e for law making or ab out the principles that should d etermine the behaviour of women (the questionnaire can be found in Abbott et al 2016). In add ition, complementary qualitative research in which respond ents can give d etailed answers and explain what they think and why (e.g. focus groups, semi-structured interviews) will also be crucial in exploring the complex sets of meanings sometimes obfuscated by being subsumed und er a single banner, e.g. 'Islam'.
Second ly, it is crucial that interpretation of data be carried out by research teams with strength and d epth in both quantitative methods and country knowled ge. Beyond id entifying d evelopments in ind ivid ual countries which might affect survey results, such expertise contributes to interpreting results. For example, the emphasis respond ents place on material conditions as essential characteristics of d emocracy -e.g. fighting unemployment and corru ption -could be und erstood as "misund erstand ing" the centrality of proced ural aspects of d emocracy. However, in light of d ecad es of " façad e d emocracy" it could also be the result of d isillusionment with proced ural d imensions which have improved neither citizens' political or socio-economic inclusion, or simply a recognition that in ord er to be politically effective the guarantee of civil-political rights must be accompanied by a commensurate guarantee of socio-economic rights.
In sum, while acknowled ging the limits and d ifficulties in carrying out public opinion survey research in the region, resulting data can play an important role in add ing a layer of sophistication in the investigation of complex social, economic, and political realities in the region and beyond . 
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